The Supply Side of Security: A Market Theory of Military Alliances (Studies in Asian Security)
Tongfi Kim
Language: English
Pages: 256
ISBN: 0804796963
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
Tongfi Kim identifies the supply of policy concessions and military commitments as the main factors that explain the bargaining power of a state in a potential or existing alliance. Additionally, three variables of a state's domestic politics significantly affect its negotiating power: whether there is strong domestic opposition to the alliance, whether the state's leader is pro-alliance, and whether that leader is vulnerable. Kim then looks beyond existing alliance literature, which focuses on threats, to produce a deductive theory based on analysis of how the global power structure and domestic politics affect alliances. As China becomes stronger and the U.S. military budget shrinks, The Supply Side of Security shows that these countries should be understood not just as competing threats, but as competing security suppliers.
Fault Analysis in Cryptography (Information Security and Cryptography)
XSS Attacks: Cross Site Scripting Exploits and Defense
Web Application Security: A Beginner's Guide
Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World
External threat to a superpower is likely to come from the other superpower. Although a weaker state might form a bandwagoning alliance with such a threat (Weitsman 2003, 30), importing military protection from the source of threat does not make sense for a superpower, as it does not need to capitulate to the other superpower. Collusion between bipolar powers is theoretically possible, but they still do not need to import active military protection because they need only a passive form of.
Own preference, I expect domestic opposition to increase the political cost of making concessions. Hypothesis 5.3: Other things being equal, a leader has an intra-alliance bargaining advantage when he or she faces strong domestic opposition to alliance cooperation. Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 summarizes the effects of the three explanatory variables on intra-alliance bargaining power. The analytical framework can be applied to both sides of a negotiation, but I hold one state’s domestic politics.
Of great powers. As will be discussed later, the underlying assumption is that, in most situations, great powers are the only effective suppliers of military protection.31 The alliance market is far from perfectly competitive: A few important players enjoy disproportionate inf luence. Accordingly, I treat great powers as the only effective security suppliers in the alliance market. Just as the number of sellers affects commercial transactions, the number of great powers or systemic polarity.
Strategic goals of allies change, exchanges of heterogeneous goods allow them to keep benefiting from the alliance. Exchanges of military goods facilitate nonmilitary cooperation, and vice versa.37 For example, “One reason the United States and Japan were able to weather the trade disputes of the 1980s with their relationship intact was the underlying foundation of the security alliance” (Finnegan 2010, 13). Nonmilitary cooperation, in turn, is expected to promote military cooperation. A major.
(1991); David (1991); Levy and Barnett (1992); and Weitsman (2003). 10. See the text of the treaty at www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1 .html. 11. “Officials across administrations of different parties stress that the desire of Korea and Australia to tighten their security relationships with the United States was a core reason why Washington was able to enter into free trade agreements with them and to do so on terms favorable to U.S. economic interests.” (Brooks, Ikenberry, and.