Reinterpreting Property
Margaret Jane Radin
Language: English
Pages: 278
ISBN: 0226702286
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
Departing from traditional libertarian and economic theories of property, Margaret Jane Radin argues that the law should take into account nonmonetary personal value attached to property—and that some things, such as bodily integrity, are so personal they should not be considered property at all. Gathered here are pieces ranging from Radin's classic early essay on property and personhood to her recent works on governmental "taking" of private property.
Margaret Jane Radin is professor of law at Stanford University. She is the author of over twenty-five articles on legal and political theory.
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“has commonly been both ignored and taken for granted in legal thought.” In “Property and Personhood” I wanted first of all to point out the tacit legal and cultural understanding that there are two kinds of property-I should have said two lunds of property relationships-and I wanted to show how broad that understanding is, how it cuts across many fields of law. I used the label “personal” to denote the kind of property that individuals are attached to as persons, and I used the label “fungible”.
Must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.117 This positivism quickly got the Court into difficulty. For example, if the government announced that the police may search a citizen’s bedroom with impunity, well-informed citizens could no longer reasonably expect privacy in their bedrooms. The Court now recognizes that a “normative inquiry” is needed in such a case.l18 So far the Court has not acknowledged that if a “normative inquiry” is relevant to such a case, it is relevant.
On assuming that tenants as a class are absolutely impoverished; government would not be required to intervene unless tenants could not afford adequate shelter. (That is, could not afford adequate shelter without falling below the minimum in other welfare rights such as food and health care.) As we have seen, the tenant’s relative poverty also figures in the personhood argument, but its role is different. The apartment the tenant has become established in does not have to be at base subsistence.
Noncommercial or efficiency losses are high. As with all practical moral decisions, there can still be undecided hard cases; for example, if efficiency losses are very high, tenants are a poor community that is deeply self-invested, and many landlords are noncommercial while not feeling community solidarity with their tenants. But I think the analysis here can at least help us sort out the hard cases from the easier ones. Iv. SOME PROVISIONS OF RENT-CONTROL LEGISLATION A survey of.
Causation, is that various legislators owed political favors to its sponsor. It could be, if asked what they intended to accomplish in passing the bill, and assuming that they had taken a truth serum, that these legislators would answer, “I intended to pay off my political debt.” Nevertheless, when we are looking for “legislative intent” we will not seek such evidence, and if we do find out about it we will likely view it as irrelevant. We will impute intent instead by asking what a more nearly.