Recognition and Social Ontology (Social and Critical Theory)
Language: English
Pages: 398
ISBN: 9004202900
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
This unique collection focuses on the unexamined connections between two contemporary, intensively debated lines of inquiry: Hegel-inspired theories of recognition (Anerkennung) and analytical social ontology. These lines address the roots of human sociality from different conceptual perspectives and have complementary strengths, variously stressing the social constitution of persons in interpersonal relations and the emergence of social and institutional reality through collective intentionality. In this book leading theorists and younger scholars offer original analyses of the connections and suggest new ways in which theories of recognition and current approaches in analytical social ontology can enrich one another.
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Rawls (The Routledge Philosophers)
Commitments. Even at the level of merely erotic awareness, it can lead to the animal’s doing things differently, in the sense of altering which objects it responds to by treating them as having the erotic significance generated by that desire. Its dispositions to respond to things differentially as food, that is, by eating them, can be altered by such practical disappointments. If all goes well with an experiential episode in such a process of learning, the subjectively appropriate differential.
Attitude is recognizing and whose significance is exhibiting the TSEA? Hegel’s answer is, I think, clear, if surprising: it is desire for recognition, the desire that others take or treat one in practice as a taker, as something things can be something for, as an instituter of significances. If we bracket for the moment the crucial question of why a desire to be recognized is the attitude for which recognizing others is the appropriate activity, and so why it institutes the significance of being.
Experience of opposed self-consciousnesses. This concerns what Brandom has elsewhere called disparagingly the “martial” rhetoric of Chapter Four, especially the talk of a struggle to the death, which Brandom wants to treat as a metonymy, a figure of sorts for genuine commitment. (Regarded this way, being willing to risk anything important could show that the commitment functioned as norm, instead of a mere expression of desire.) But Hegel treats the extreme situation, the risk of life, as a key.
Cover only an aspect, or performative moment, of cooperative communication. Grice focuses on the speaker’s attempt to communicate or to start a certain kind of cooperation. Davidson focuses on the attempt of the hearer to understand or interpret the attempt of the speaker. But truth and meaning as proprieties of speech acts can be comprehended only with reference to evaluations of success or failure of cooperative communication. It is not me as a speaker and not you as a hearer, but us both,.
Respect for universal individual rights and the support of the cultural traditions of groups. As for Honneth, the membership or the sense of belonging to such a group is a necessary condition for an individual character and sociopsychological “identity.” However, individuals may lack basic rights within their cultural groups. Or else they are not able to carry them out because they lack the ability of, for instance, reading and writing. For Taylor, the solution to this problem seems to lie within.