Hitler's Bureaucrats: The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil
Yaacov Lozowick
Language: English
Pages: 320
ISBN: 0826457118
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
Hitler's Bureaucrats looks at the words and actions of Eichmann and the bureaucrats he worked with in Berlin and throughout the more significant Gestapo offices in Western Europe. It claims that Hannah Arendt's thesis about the banality of evil was wrong. In chilling detail, it presents a group of people completely aware of what they were doing, people with high ideological motivation, people of initiative and dexterity who contributed far beyond what was necessary. While most of these bureaucrats sat behind desks rather than behind machine guns, there was nothing banal about the role they played in the destruction of European Jewry.
The primary motivating force for their actions was a well-developed acceptance of the tenets of Nazi ideology of which racial anti-Semitism was a central component. As the documentation created by Eichmann and his colleagues reveals, not a single one of them ever expressed regret for their actions against the Jews, unless it was regret for having to pay the consequences.
The Third Reich in History and Memory
The Occult Roots of Nazism: Secret Aryan Cults and Their Influence on Nazi Ideology
Die "Juni-Aktion" 1938. Eine Dokumentation zur Radikalisierung der Judenverfolgung
Hitler's Bureaucrats: The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil
Competing voices, narratives and viewpoints, evil seems a leftover, a relic of an earlier, religious age. Yet for me, the writing of this book has been accompanied by the growing awareness of the aridity of these explanations and, finally, of their futility. Having spent years watching Adolf Eichmann and his colleagues from as close as I dared, I was forced to re-evaluate the understanding with which I began my research; eventually, an honest appraisal of what I was finding forced me to recognize.
Deportations). Wôhrn, whose code was a—1, dealt with Mischlinge, the Reich Association and with exceptional cases involving prominent Jews. Novak continued to coordinate the trains and was called a—2. Hartmann joined him, but continued to handle the few emigration cases that remained. Môs's section was a—3, responsible for cases in which agencies or people with authority wished to intervene or receive information on a specific Jew. It also was in charge of "protective custody/' In April 1942,.
Should not be separated, nor should children up to the age of 14 be separated from their parents.46 During the months that followed, the department's staff was occupied with minor revisions and exceptions. Suhr complained to Rademacher about the good life being enjoyed by the Jews of Lichtenstein, who were protected from the Nazis.47 Either he or Hunsche gave in to pressure from the foreign ministry and instructed the Security Police not to trouble an Italian noblewoman who was Jewish according.
Henry Friedlander, Origins of Nazi Genocide, p. 194. 133. TR.10-767c, pp. 751, 755-6. 134. Richter: TR.10-754, pp. 160-2, 191-3; Dannecker: TR.10-754, pp. 191-3. 134 Hitler's Bureaucrats about the possibility of frustrating a Romanian plan for the emigration of tens of thousands of Jews to Palestine. On March 3, 1943, he prepared for Eichmann a letter to the foreign ministry containing a request to thwart the efforts of Romanian Jews to send 1000 children with escorts to Palestine via.
Week of August 3—10, Lages, Punten and Worlein met eleven times with the council leadership in an attempt to solve the problem.37 The Nazis then handled the problem in their own way. On August 6 they carried out a large "action," or roundup, in which they arrested 2000 Jews, who were brought to police headquarters in Amsterdam. Punten, who ran the operation, chose 600 of the detainees the next day and sent them to Westerbork.38 The rest of the 2000 were released. Some Jews who worked at close.