Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory
Language: English
Pages: 840
ISBN: 0415782317
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory is an outstanding anthology of the most important topics, theories and debates in ethics, compiled by one of the leading experts in the field. It includes sixty-six extracts covering the central domains of ethics:
- why be moral?
- the meaning of moral language
- morality and objectivity
- consequentialism
- deontology
- virtue and character
- value and well-being
- moral psychology
- applications: including abortion, famine relief and consent.
Included are both classical extracts from Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant and Mill, as well as contemporary classics from philosophers such as Thomas Nagel, Thomas Scanlon, Martha Nussbaum, Derek Parfit, and Peter Singer.
A key feature of the anthology is that it covers the perennial topics in ethics as well as very recent ones, such as moral psychology, responsibility and experimental philosophy. Each section is introduced and placed in context by the editor, making this an ideal anthology for anyone studying ethics or ethical theory.
Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits
Poststructuralism: A Very Short Introduction
Corporation Nation: How Corporations are Taking Over Our Lives -- and What We Can Do About It
The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger
Héroes, machos y patriotas: El fútbol entre la violencia y los medios
‘Matthew’ counts as Matthew; that is what is settled by the meaning with which we use ‘Matthew.’ Standing in this relation to these uses of ‘Matthew’ is surely a contingent property of Matthew, however. Matthew could have existed in a world in which he was never called ‘Matthew’ during or after his life, or in a world in which Jesus never had any disciples and the relevant uses of ‘Matthew’ never occurred. Similar considerations apply to theories about the natures of properties or of kinds of.
Obligation to adhere to prudentially undertaken commitments. He has no real concern for the advantage of others, which would lead him to modify his pursuit of advantage when it conflicted with the similar pursuits of others. Unless he expects to gain, he is unwilling to accept restrictions on the pursuit of advantage which are intended to equalize the opportunities open to all. In other words, he has no concern with fairness. We tend to think of the moral man as one who does not seek his own.
Know it, because of the announcements they have made to each other. Now consider an exchange of ideas, of meanings, rather than an exchange of practical reasons. Here we do not find these two possibilities. If meanings could not be shared, there would be no point in announcing the results of one’s private thinking to anybody else. If they can be shared, then it is in principle possible to think the issues through together, and that is what people do when they talk. But if we have to grant that.
Non-hypothetical ‘should’, or else the non-hypothetical ‘should’ does not necessarily imply reasons for acting. If it does not necessarily imply reasons for acting we may ask why it is supposed to do so in the case of morality. Why cannot the indifferent amoral man say that for him ‘shouldm’ gives no reason for acting, treating ‘shouldm’ as most of us treat ‘shoulde’? Those who insist that ‘shouldm’ is categorical in this second ‘reason-giving’ sense do not seem to realise that they never prove.
Be supplemented by two arguments designed to undermine rational egoism. The first relies on the importance of autonomy. Autonomous choices for desired or valued ends at least sometimes supply reasons for action, even when such choices are known by the agent not to enhance (or perhaps only to damage) his self-interest. If a soldier decides to sacrifice himself for his comrades, then he has some reason to take the means necessary to saving their lives, even though such actions are condemned from.