Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Man and a Nation under Attack

Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Man and a Nation under Attack

Michael Gannon

Language: English

Pages: 320

ISBN: 0805066985

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


A naval historian draws on newly revealed primary documents to shed light on the tragic errors that led to the devastating attack, Washington's role, and the man who took the fall for the Japanese tactical victory

Michael Gannon begins his authoritative account of the "impossible to forget" attack with the essential background story of Japan's imperialist mission and the United States' uncertain responses-especially two lost chances of delaying the inevitable attack until the military was prepared to defend Pearl Harbor.
Gannon disproves two Pearl Harbor legends: first, that there was a conspiracy to withold intelligence from the Pacific Commander in order to force a Pacific war, and second, that Admiral Kimmel was informed but failed to act. Instead, Gannon points to two critical factors ignored by others: that information about the attack gleaned from the "Magic" code intercepts was not sent to Admiral Kimmel, and that there was no possibility that Kimmel could have defended Pearl Harbor because the Japanese were militarily far superior to the American forces in December of 1941.

Gannon has divided the story into three parts: the background, eyewitness accounts of the stunning Japanese tactical victory, and the aftermath, which focuses on the Commander, who was blamed for the biggest military disaster in American history.

Pearl Harbor Betrayed will be published to coincide with the 60th anniversary of Pearl Harbor.

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That the Japanese would be to the south, since that was the fleet’s training area and all commercial shipping had been routed to southward, hence the Japanese carriers would likely have been observed before they launched their aircraft.13 In any event, both surface and air searches of the approaches to Oahu continued with what assets were available during the days and weeks that followed, since both Kimmel and Admiral Nimitz, who relieved him on the seventeenth and formally took command on the.

Necessitating such economy in training as limiting the number of rounds an individual gunner could fire in drills. PHA, Pt. 32, p. 392. 46. Ibid., Box 29, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics to the Chief of Naval Operations, 5 March 1941. 47. Gordon W. Prange interview with Bloch, 28 November 1962; cited in Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story at Pearl Harbor (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 68 48. NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 29, Stark to Kimmel, 13 January 1941. 49. Ibid.,.

3, Kimmel, “Memorandum as to Cooperation and Coordination Between General Short and Admiral Kimmel,” 17 July 1944, p. 9: “My own primary concern was the paralysing [sic] orders I had from the Navy Department to await an overt act by Japan.” 56. The story of how Turner arrogated to himself the functions of naval intelligence is told in Jeffrey M. Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy’s Intelligence Dilemma, 1919–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), pp. 157–161; Dyer, Amphibians,.

Of Navigation, in June 1941, I urged that additional patrol planes be supplied to the fleet.” He referred to testimony he had given earlier: Both Admiral Bloch and I had been continually making such requests. I referred to the various requests of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District for patrol planes which I strongly and favorably endorsed. Had the Commandant been able to secure patrol planes for the 14th Naval District, it would have materially strengthened the base defense. The Chief of.

Japanese Army troops marched across the Marco Polo Bridge west of Peking, every major diplomatic note exchanged between Washington and Tokyo had the assault on China as its text or subtext. In unmistakable language, the U.S. State Department condemned the Japanese incursion and called the world’s attention to its violation of the first paragraph of Article I of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, signed by Japan on 6 February 1922, which read: “The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:.

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