Information Security and Privacy: 18th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2013, Brisbane, Australia, July 1-3, 2013, Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science / Security and Cryptology)

Information Security and Privacy: 18th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2013, Brisbane, Australia, July 1-3, 2013, Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science / Security and Cryptology)

Colin Boyd, Leonie Simpson

Language: English

Pages: 446

ISBN: 2:00185247

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


This book constitutes the refereed conference proceedings of the 18th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2013, held in Brisbane, Australia, in July 2013.

The 28 revised full papers presented were carefully selected from 78 submissions.

Conference papers are organized in technical sessions, covering topics of Cryptanalysis, RSA, Lattices and Security Proofs, Public Key Cryptography, Hashing, Signatures, Passwords, Mobile Security, and Secret Sharing.

Hacking the Cable Modem: What Cable Companies Don't Want You to Know

Cyber Operations: Building, Defending, and Attacking Modern Computer Networks

Malware Forensics Field Guide for Windows Systems: Digital Forensics Field Guides

iOS Forensic Analysis: for iPhone, iPad, and iPod touch (Books for Professionals by Professionals)

Security Patterns in Practice: Designing Secure Architectures Using Software Patterns

SELinux System Administration

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RSA composite N ∈ Nsafe RSA on each input 1k . We follow the setting of [10,11,20] that N is restricted to a product of two distinct safe primes. The SRSA assumption is defined as follows: Definition 2 (Strong RSA). A probabilistic algorithm A -breaks SRSA if Pr xE ≡ y (mod N ) : N ← GenMod(1k ), y ∈R QRN , (x, E) ← A(N, y) ≥ , where x ∈ Z× N and E > 1 is a natural number, and the probability is taken over the coin flips of GenMod and A, and the uniformly random choice y from QRN . The pair (N, y).

Pp. 27–43. Springer, Heidelberg (2003) 6. Bl¨ omer, J., May, A.: A tool kit for finding small roots of bivariate polynomials over the integers. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3494, pp. 251–267. Springer, Heidelberg (2005) 7. Cox, D., Little, J., O’Shea, D.: Ideals, varieties, and algorithms: An introduction to computational algebraic geometry and commutative algebra. Springer, New York (2007) 8. Coron, J.-S., Naccache, D., Tibouchi, M.: Fault Attacks Against emv Signatures. In:.

Only if γ 1 √ n 1 − β) > γ2 . However, the calculation of the dimension and the volume of this lattice is too complicated. We relax the condition (4) and select the shiftpolynomials that satisfy n 0≤ n ij ≤ m and 0 ≤ γ1 i1 + γ¯ j=1 ij ≤ βt. (5) j=2 The new parameter γ¯ should be optimized later. This polynomials selection is the exact multivariate generalization of Theorem 3 if and only if γ2 = · · · = γn . However, this relaxed algorithm is superior to Herrmann and May’s algorithm for the.

Adversaries are ordinary Turing machines. To avoid the countability argument, Buldas, Laur and Niitsoo [2] proposed an alternative oracle extraction approach where the oracle extraction step is unnecessary. Rather than trying to extract a suitable deterministic oracle from a probability distribution, they assumed that there exists a black-box reduction (that works for every f ) and derived a contradiction by assuming the probabilistic separation condition and the average (over f ) version of the.

Internal state of the cipher, before the KeyIV mixing. Due to this symmetric padding, slide attacks based on the observation that one could obtain Key-IV pairs that produce -bit shifted keystream with probability 2−2 , were reported in [9]. This probability was improved to 2− in [6]. In the SKEW conference of 2011, the designers proposed the Grain-128a cipher that accommodated both functionalities of message encryption and authentication [2,3]. In order to protect against the previous attacks,.

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