Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb
Strobe Talbott
Language: English
Pages: 268
ISBN: 0815783000
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
On May 11, 1998, three nuclear devices detonated under the Thar Desert in India shook the surrounding villages—and the rest of the world. The immediate effect was to plunge U.S.-India relations, already vexed by decades of tension and estrangement, into a new crisis. The situation deteriorated further when Pakistan responded in kind two weeks later, testing a nuclear weapon for the first time. Engaging India is the firsthand story of the diplomacy conducted between the United States and the two South Asian neighbors after the nuclear tests. In this book, the American point man for the dialogue takes us behind the scenes of one of the most suspenseful and consequential diplomatic dramas of our time, reconstructing what happened—and why—with narrative verve, rich human detail, and penetrating analysis. From June 1998 to September 2000, in what was the most extensive dialogue ever between the United States and India, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh met fourteen times in seven countries on three continents. They discussed both the immediate items on the security and nonproliferation agenda, as well as their wider visions for the U.S.-India relationship and the potential for economic and strategic cooperation between the two countries. As the relationship improved over the course of the talks, the United States was to able play a role in averting the possibility of nuclear war over the contested territory of Kashmir in the summer of 1999—the specifics of which are included for the first time in this book, told in way only a protagonist can. The Talbott-Singh diplomacy laid the groundwork for the transformational visit of President Bill Clinton to India in March 2000 and helped end fifty years of estrangement between the world's two largest democracies. As pursuit of Islamic militants continues across South Asia, the increased cooperation established by Talbott and Singh will be an invaluable asset for current and future leaders of both countries. This book provides, for the first time, an insider's perspective on the ground-breaking efforts to build a cordial relationship between the United States and India. The general reader will find it accessible, and more important, an indispensable tool for understanding America's current role in South Asia, and the prospects for improved relations.
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Up to India,” which had been “a foolhardy and perilous substitute for common sense.” When Clinton heard what Helms had said, he snorted, “Ol’ Jesse’s got that exactly wrong. My mistake was not cozying up to India a lot earlier so that we might have had some leverage over those guys before they hit the button on that bomb.” A few members of the American foreign policy establishment voiced some degree of support for, or at least open-mindedness about, what the Indians had done. Henry Kissinger made.
Off, just as Bob Einhorn had done in Geneva. But it was too late: the diplomats at the UN had already agreed on a text calling for India and Pakistan “immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programs” and to join the NPT as nonnuclear-weapons states. These exhortations were equally aimed at India and Pakistan and equally unwelcome to both. But the resolution also “encouraged” the two countries to “address the root causes” of the tensions between them, “including Kashmir.” This.
Is called, teased me about how hard it must be for 05 8300-0 chap5 9/27/04 4:04 PM Page 103 stuck on the tarmac 103 the United States to get used to dealing with India as a fellow nuclear power. Suddenly, to the astonishment of everyone at our table, she burst into song. In a comically broad American accent, she belted out a Tom Lehrer number from 1965: First we got the bomb and that was good, ’Cause we love peace and motherhood. Then Russia got the bomb, but that’s O.K., ’Cause the.
Own “strategic dialogue” with New Delhi. Both France and India regarded this new channel as a way of tweaking Uncle Sam’s nose. The French thought they had found, in India, a partner in their effort to build what they called a “multipolar” international system—that is, one in which a strong, largely French-led European Union would offer an alternative to the “unipolar” world headquartered in Washington. The Indians, who nurtured their own resentment at what they saw as American bossiness, did.
Outweigh Clinton’s confidence that the visit would be, as he put it, “a transformational event.” Clinton believed that by becoming the principal agent of engagement and by making his trip a dramatic demonstration of improved relations, he could increase the influence that he—and his successors— would have over their South Asian counterparts on all issues, including nonproliferation. 10 8300-0 chap10 6/29/04 5:39 PM Page 190 ten A Guest in the Parliament In January 2000, when I returned to.